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Being asked to contribute to this Festschrift for Bob Rabin is both a
privilege and a delight. To revisit his vast and influential oeuvre is to
experience anew the breadth and depth of his scholarship. It is a
sumptuous banquet at which one can sample a great many delicacies
and then go back to refill one's plate with one's favorite Rabinesque
dishes. (Indeed, if-like me and Oscar Wilde-the one thing you can-
not resist is temptation,' then you may want to return for thirds.)
Paying homage to Bob is even more gratifying, of course, because
of his character. In my experience, it is uncommon for a superb
scholar to also be an equally admirable human being and celebrated
teacher, yet Bob exemplifies this elusive unity of excellence. Gener-
ous with his mind and time, scrupulous in his research and explication,
attentive to the wishes and eccentricities of others, softened and en-
riched by the intimacies of family and friendships, Bob is what we
should all aspire to be-a magisterial mensch.
When I agreed to participate in this Festschrift, Bob proposed that I
leave his torts and compensation-systems writing to the other sympo-
sium participants and instead review his sizable body of work on the
administrative and regulatory state.2 Knowing what I would recover
in his administrative state articles, which I had long admired, I agreed
with alacrity. As expected, it has been a rewarding assignment.
Many of these administrative state articles were written in the
1970s, long before I met Bob-indeed, long before I began teaching
law. My very first contact with Bob occurred when I was engaged as
director of Consumers Union's Washington, D.C. office. He phoned
me during his research on public interest lawyering. As I recall, he
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1. OSCAR WILDE, LADY WINDERMERE's FAN (1892).
2. This is the reward I get for using his superb torts casebook--co-authored by Marc Franklin
and now Michael Green-for more than thirty years, through seven of its eight editions! MARC




introduced himself and his project-a study of public interest law 3-
and said that he would soon call me back for a lengthier interview.
He did not do so, an inauspicious beginning to our friendship.4 Some-
how, we have managed to get beyond it. And somehow, his article,
Lawyers for Social Change, was a great success even without my per-
sonal insights.
Rabin's article stands apart from his other administrative state writ-
ing, so I can readily treat it as a one-off stage-setter for considering his
other work in this field. What makes this article different? Like all of
Bob's administrative state pieces, it brims with insights about the
processes of policy development, lawmaking, and implementation by
agencies. But it is less preoccupied with how these processes and the
associated administrative law doctrines work than it is with a particu-
lar institutional actor on the administrative-state stage: the public in-
terest law firm.
Lawyers for Social Change provides an exceptionally rich introduc-
tion to this then-emerging phenomenon in several respects. First, Ra-
bin presents the public interest law firm in its larger historical context.
Beginning with an account of how the American Civil Liberties Union
(ACLU) and the NAACP Legal Defense Fund (LDF) evolved, Rabin
calls attention to some of their most important internal organizational
characteristics, which he rightly identifies as shaping their behavioral
incentives-the ways in which they seek to satisfy their "organiza-
tional maintenance" imperatives 5-and hence the contours of their
larger legal-reform agendas. 6 Among the most consequential of these
characteristics are programmatic focus and coherence, and the rela-
tively "clean" and fiscally manageable nature of constitutional test-
case litigation.7
After placing the public interest law firm in historical context, Ra-
bin situates it ideologically as well. He elaborates upon the interest-
group-pluralism model that dominated political science and even pop-
ular thinking well into the 1960s, when the public interest law move-
ment began to spread beyond the ACLU and LDF;8 to some extent,
that model still dominates, albeit in more sophisticated and qualified
forms. The notion that liberal process norms assured politically legiti-
mate and substantively acceptable outcomes presupposed robust par-
3. See Robert L. Rabin, Lawyers for Social Change: Perspectives on Public Interest Law, 28
STAN. L. REV. 207 (1976) [hereinafter Rabin, Lawyers for Social Change].
4. He did, however, mention my Consumers Union Office in that article. See id. at 256.
5. E.g., JAMES 0. WILSON, POLITICAL ORGANIZATIONs 30 (1995).
6. See Rabin, Lawyers for Social Change, supra note 3, at 209-24.
7. See id. at 220-23.
8. See id. at 224-31.
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ticipation in the policymaking process by all significantly affected
interests. Beginning in the late 1960s-an era of intense dissatisfac-
tion with political outcomes in areas as disparate as the Vietnam War,
the environment, the status of minorities and women, the conditions
of American cities, and much else-many commentators increasingly
questioned this premise and thus the legitimacy of the traditional lib-
eral political process itself.9
To this political critique, Rabin added an economic one. In Mancur
Olson's canonical work, The Logic of Collective Action, the costs of
organization-of communication, coalition building, resource seeking,
representation, and bargaining-mean that social interests that are
very widely shared but diffuse will almost inevitably lose out in the
competition with interest groups that are more concentrated.10 This
theory condemned consumer and environmental groups, among
others, to greater weakness in the political bargaining process of
interest-group pluralism than the number of people who supported
their goals would otherwise suggest. Indeed, this remorseless dynamic
created a particularly cruel political irony: the relative weakness of
these groups was caused precisely by the near-universal sympathy to-
ward individuals with the groups' objectives. After all, these groups
were defined by interests and goals that virtually all members of soci-
ety shared regardless of their many other, narrower affiliations.
If, as these critiques suggested, the pluralist bargaining process was
systematically incomplete, unbalanced, and-to that extent-illegiti-
mate, then the public interest organization had a vital, legitimating,
gap-filling role to perform: the social, political, and legal representa-
tion of these traditionally unrepresented or underrepresented groups.
This widespread perception of the role of public interest organizations
in society fueled their growing prominence and power during the de-
cades that followed. This was the phenomenon, particularly in its law-
reform mode, that Rabin found so arresting and worthy of study.
9. The classic text on this development, discussed by Rabin, was THEODORE J. Lowi, THE
END OF LIBERALISM (1969); see also Rabin, Lawyers for Social Change, supra note 3, at 224-25.
10. See generally IANCUR OLsoN JR., THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACrION (1965).
If the members of a large group rationally seek to maximize their personal welfare,
they will not act to advance their common or group objectives unless there is coercion
to force them to do so, or unless some separate incentive, distinct from the achievement
of the common or group. interest, is offered to the members of the group individually
on the condition that they help bear the costs or burdens involved in the achievement
of the group objectives.
Id. at 2. For a critical essay on a related book by Olson, see Peter H. Schuck, The Politics of
Economic Growth, 2 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 359 (1984) (reviewing MANCUR OLSON, THE RISE
AND DECLINE OF NATIONS (1982)).
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But while Rabin was beguiled by the public interest law firm as an
instrument of reform, he neither romanticized it nor overlooked its
inherent limitations. He observed that the broadest constituency
claimed by public interest law firms-the consumer interest-was not
represented in any obvious sense by most of these firms, which often
advocated the interests of employees, making "the relationship to a
consumer interest . . . highly tenuous."" But representational tenu-
ousness was not Rabin's only objection to the grandiose claims of pub-
lic interest law firms: "More generally, aesthetic sensibility,
occupational safety, public health, and a host of other values bear a
price tag that, assuming internalization, must be borne by 'consum-
ers."' 12 For much the same reason, "the suggestion of a broad
majoritarian or 'societal' interest as the underpinning for public inter-
est law is unconvincing."13
To these objections, he might have added others. First, consumer
interests, far from being monolithic and readily discernible, are
extraordinarily diverse and cannot possibly be defined, much less rep-
resented, by any single organization or even by a group of them.14
The inevitable trade off between the quality and the cost of goods is
itself as variable as the number, preferences, and ability to pay of con-
sumers. Even the interest of consumers in more and better informa-
tion is affected by the marginal cost and value of such information,
which will vary from consumer to consumer and according to the form
and complexity of the information. Second, many, if not all, consumer
interests are represented indirectly, and often more effectively, by
consumer-goods businesses in competitive, law-compliant markets.
The interests of consumers in free trade, for example, are well repre-
sented by importers of goods seeking the lowest prices from their sup-
pliers. Finally, public interest law firms often compete with one
another to litigate or otherwise represent the "consumer interest,"
11. Rabin, Lawyers for Social Change, supra note 3, at 229.
12. Id.
13. Id. at 229-30 (footnote omitted). Rabin also observes that "public interest advocates sim-
ply do not have discrete clients whose personal liberty or property is at stake," without exploring
the ethical dilemmas that this "clientless" practice may entail for public interest lawyers. Id. at
234. Also uncritically, he makes the important point that public interest law firms strive to avoid
complex factual litigation, without exploring how this perfectly predictable concession to limited
organizational resources might encourage judicial decisions-and the public policies that such
decisions may shape-that are less attentive to real-world facts than sound public policy deci-
sions should be. Id. at 237.
14. Rabin does discuss Ralph Nader, who I believe represents both the strengths and the
weaknesses of self-styled consumer representation. Id. at 225. For a very early discussion of
Naderism, written when I was in Nader's employ, see Peter H. Schuck, The Nader Chronicles, 50
TEx. L. Rev. 1455 (1972) (book review).
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which suggests yet another dimension of contestability with respect to
the definition of that interest.15 For example, one group may demand
higher levels of safety despite the resulting higher costs, while another
group may emphasize the interests of lower-income consumers in
trading off those values differently. This conflict can also arise when
U.S. manufacturers propose to sell some of their products that do not
meet the higher U.S. safety standards in developing-country markets.
The main purpose of Rabin's inquiry was not to describe the public
interest law firm, but rather to explain its role in the administrative
law process. Focusing on a number of now-canonical judicial deci-
sions that expanded standing, intervention, and other public participa-
tion rights, 16 Rabin shows how the public interest groups that
achieved these legal victories decided to organize their priorities and
agendas in light of their organizational imperatives and constraints.
One of those constraints is "avoidance techniques," with which
agencies hope to minimize the organizational costs and policy changes
that a court order might require. 7 One such avoidance technique,
which Rabin details in his earlier study of agency implementation of a
costly change to a welfare statute, is to confine the effect of judicial
decisions that the agency opposes to the particular jurisdiction in
which the case arose.18 Public interest law firms in turn seek to neu-
tralize those evasions by triggering congressional oversight, closely
monitoring agency implementation, bringing follow-up litigation,
pressing courts to issue self-implementing orders, and other meth-
ods.19 Another major obstacle to agency implementation of court-
ordered reforms, not mentioned by Rabin, is the fact that the most
common judicial remedy in reviewing administrative error is a remand
to the relevant agency for further proceedings. 20 This gives the agency
15. One example, among many, of this competition is the split over asbestos injury compensa-
tion legislation between the National Legal Policy Center, which supported the compensation
legislation pending before Congress, and Ralph Nader's Public Citizen, which opposed it. JEB
BARNES, DUST-UP: ASBESTOS LITIGATION AND THE FAILURE OF COMMONSENSE POLICY RE-
FORM 62 (2011).
16. See, e.g., United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163, 184-85 (1965); Calvert Cliffs' Coordinating
Comm., Inc. v. U.S. Atomic Energy Comm'n, 449 F.2d 1109, 1118 (D.C. Cir. 1971); Friends of
the Earth v. FCC, 449 F.2d 1164, 1168-69 (D.C. Cir. 1971); Office of Commc'n of the United
Church of Christ v. FCC, 359 F.2d 994, 1000-02 (D.C. Cir. 1966); Scenic Hudson Pres. Confer-
ence v. Fed. Power Comm'n, 354 F.2d 608, 616 (2d Cir. 1965).
17. See Rabin, Lawyers for Social Change, supra note 3, at 243.
18. See Robert L. Rabin, Implementation of the Cost-of-Living Adjustment for AFDC Recipi-
ents: A Case Study in Welfare Administration, 118 U. PA. L. REV. 1143, 1159 (1970) [hereinafter
Rabin, Implementation of the Cost-of-Living Adjustment].
19. See Rabin, Lawyers for Social Change, supra note 3, at 248-55.
20. See generally Peter H. Schuck & E. Donald Elliott, To the Chevron Station: An Empirical
Study of Federal Administrative Law, 1990 DUKE L.J. 984.
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another bite-sometimes many biteS21-at the apple, occasioning
much delay and the opportunity to undermine the legal principle es-
tablished by the public interest law firm.
Nevertheless, there can be no question that public interest litigation
has recast administrative law over the last four decades, making it far
more transparent, participatory, sensitive to a wider array of interests,
and-in Rabin's term-"pedagogical." 22 And, as Rabin notes, the
mere possibility of such litigation creates an in terrorem effect on
agencies fearful of judicial and congressional review at the instigation
of the new public interest participants. 23 This prospect surely affects
the terms of the complex, informal, protracted, multiparty bargaining
process that, in turn, shapes so much of the substance of administra-
tive policymaking. 24 Whether this (no longer) new administrative law
produces outcomes superior to the pre-1970s kind is an issue of enor-
mous significance to American society. Unfortunately, Rabin does
not address this issue. This reluctance is perfectly understandable, for
such a bottom-line assessment would beg numerous normative and
empirical questions to which there are no unequivocal, uncontrover-
sial, or readily measurable answers.
This complexity would not necessarily leave Rabin or us completely
at sea in making such an assessment. Some of the costs of the new
administrative law may be significant even if unquantifiable. Others
may be quantifiable: longer and more complex decision processes at
the agency level; more appeals to the courts and Congress; fewer
clear-cut and stable policy outcomes; delay-related errors and cost in-
creases; more uncertainty on the part of investors and firms subject to
possible sanctions for noncompliance; and so on. Agencies may suc-
ceed in reducing these costs through multiple rounds of advance con-
sultations with affected parties in the case of rulemaking, but this
21. The classic example is the SEC v. Chenery Corp. line of cases. See SEC v. Chenery Corp.,
332 U.S. 194, 196 (1947); see also SEC v. Chenery Corp., 318 U.S. 80, 95 (1943).
22. See Rabin, Lawyers for Social Change, supra note 3, at 252-54 (describing "[p]ublic inter-
est law ... as an educational vehicle or as a means of establishing procedural bulwarks that have
major significance in later cases").
23. See id. at 253 ("Occasional cases resist easy quantification, because they force individual
self-examination, mobilize organizational activity, and trigger political reaction. From a long-
range perspective, such cases demonstrate again that, whatever its limitations, the judicial forum
plays a creative role in the process of law reform.").
24. See Michael Asimow, When the Curtain Falls: Separation of Functions in the Federal Ad-
ministrative Agencies, 81 COLUM. L. REV. 759, 794 (1981) ("[A]n agency engaged in rulemaking
is a political creature, which must command a minimum degree of acceptance from its constitu-
encies. If its processes are perceived as unfair, it may encounter congressional interference
brought on by disgruntled regulated interests, and its rules may be actively resisted in practice.").
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tactic too involves additional delay-and its associated costs-and is
not as feasible when policies are made through adjudication.
To be sure, the benefits of more robust participation and protracted
consideration of these issues might exceed the process, error, and un-
certainty costs. These benefits may include improved information
about the likely consequences of proposed policies; greater public
confidence in agency decisions; less "capture" by regulated and other
well-organized interests; and better decisions-whatever "better"
means. Whether these benefits in fact exceed the costs is, of course,
the $64 billion question, and Rabin wisely does not attempt to answer
it. The difficulty of doing so is suggested by the intricate feedback
loops revealed by many detailed studies of administrative law cases-
for example, Jerry L. Mashaw and David L. Harfst's finding that the
costs to agencies of proceeding through the more-inclusive, techno-
cratic, participatory process of informal rulemaking sometimes cause
them to make policy by instead using narrower, more opaque forms of
agency policymaking, such as agency adjudication. 25 In a realm as
complex, dynamic, multifarious, and interdependent as the adminis-
trative process, the law of unanticipated consequences operates with
special force and remorselessness.
II. ANALYSIS
In the remainder of this Article, I shall identify and then comment
upon some of the principal preoccupations and substantive themes
that inform Rabin's administrative state work, themes that are of en-
during interest and salience in the field. These themes are (1) the
need for empiricism in administrative state scholarship; (2) the impor-
tance of informal, nonlegal aspects of the administrative process; (3)
the dilemma of administrative discretion; (4) the historical evolution
of the administrative state; and (5) the need to balance competing val-
ues in administration.
A. Empiricism
Today, administrative state scholars often conduct empirical studies
of administrative agencies, and other scholars welcome these studies,
but this was not always so. It is easy to forget that when Rabin was a
25. See JERRY L. MASHAW & DAVID L. HARFST, THE STRUGGLE FOR Airo SAFETY 200
(1990) ("Compliance with 'proceduralized' judicial review for rationality, combined with the de-
mands of executive orders from three presidents, pressed [the National Highway Traffic Safety
Administration] relentlessly toward a defensive, checks-and-balances internal structure for pro-
posing and acting on its rulemaking initiatives. The agency, as a matter of formal internal proce-
dure, began to litigate with itself.").
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young scholar in the 1960s and 1970s, such studies were relatively un-
common. Yet early in his career, Rabin sounded the call for more
detailed, fine-grained accounts of how agencies actually functioned:
their formal and informal routines, organizational incentives, animat-
ing norms, and political and bureaucratic challenges. 26 This might
seem like faint praise. After all, who would not welcome such
studies?
But Rabin did not content himself with urging others to conduct
such studies; he underwrote that call by researching and writing such
articles himself.27 For a variety of familiar reasons, empirical work is
difficult to pull off. 28 This probably explains why, even today, rela-
tively few administrative law professors do it and why those who do
tend to focus on statistical studies about the patterns of reviewing-
court decisions.29 This work can be done largely at one's desk or in
the library without venturing out into the field. (This is not a criti-
cism; such studies can be very valuable.)
Rabin's field work on agencies-the Department of Veterans Ad-
ministration;30 the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare;31
the Selective Service System;32 and the Department of Justice 33-was
different. It was the scholarly equivalent of what journalists call shoe-
leather reporting. He undertook the often-tedious, time-consuming,
unglamorous, and frustrating work of poring over statutes, regula-
tions, and other administrative guidance; visiting program offices; in-
terviewing bureaucrats and their putative clients; examining agency
26. See Robert L. Rabin, Agency Criminal Referrals in the Federal System: An Empirical Study
of Prosecutorial Discretion, 24 STAN. L. REV. 1036 (1972) [hereinafter Rabin, Agency Criminal
Referrals] ("It is imperative that empirical work be undertaken, exploring the process by which
agency rules are made, agency adjudication is conducted, and informal agency action is taken.");
Rabin, Implementation of the Cost-of-Living Adjustment, supra note 18 ("More information is
needed about the pressures shaping agency policymaking and about the influence of agency
policy on both coordinate policymakers and the regulated parties.").
27. E.g., Rabin, Agency Criminal Referrals, supra note 26; Rabin, Lawyers for Social Change,
supra note 3.
28. See generally Peter H. Schuck, Why Don't Law Professors Do More Empirical Research?,
39 J. LEGAL EDUC. 323 (1989).
29. E.g., Richard L. Revesz, Environmental Regulation, Ideology, and the D.C. Circuit, 83 VA.
L. REV. 1717 (1997). My work with E. Donald Elliott, To the Chevron Station, supra note 20,
was largely statistical but also sought to follow up to determine what happened after remand in
individual cases. Schuck & Elliot, supra note 20.
30. See generally Robert L. Rabin, Preclusion of Judicial Review in the Processing of Claims
for Veterans' Benefits: A Preliminary Analysis, 27 STAN. L. REV. 905 (1975).
31. See generally Rabin, Implementation of the Cost-of-Living Adjustment, supra note 18.
32. See generally Robert L. Rabin, Do You Believe in a Supreme Being-The Administration
of the Conscientious Objector Exemption, 1967 Wis. L. REV. 642 [hereinafter Rabin, Do You
Believe].
33. See generally Rabin, Agency Criminal Referrals, supra note 26.
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records; analyzing court rulings; parsing congressional influence on
agency decisions; seeing how priorities are set and shifted, and how
resources get allocated; appreciating implementation challenges; and
comparing goals with actual outcomes.34 Rabin's early case studies
demonstrate that a lack of statistical rigor can be more than compen-
sated by greater insights, authentic resonances, and more textured
explanations.
This kind of work is uncommon even today,35 but why is it valua-
ble? The answer is quite straightforward. Detailed analysis of cases
will often be the best way to identify, verify, or refute theoretical hy-
potheses, uncover the deep structure of an administrative organism,
and understand how administrative processes actually work. This
leads naturally to the next Rabinesque theme.
B. Informal Aspects of the Administrative Process
Rabin recognized that he was far from the first administrative state
scholar to decry the attention-obsession is not too strong a word-
that casebook authors and commentators in the field pay to judicial
review.3 6 I can do no better than to quote Rabin himself on this
subject:
A wide range of administrative behavior-negotiating with regu-
lated parties, making speeches, issuing nonbinding directives, estab-
lishing enforcement priorities, hiring key personnel, developing
internal channels of responsibility and many other critical kinds of
decisions-is simply beyond the ambit of judicial consideration.
Furthermore, a variety of external influences on the administra-
tive process do not leave the kind of imprint on agency decisions
that would be relevant to a reviewing court. I have in mind such
factors as constituency influence, congressional oversight, executive
appointments and market structure. Yet all of these internal activi-
ties and external forces shape the substance and process of policy
formulation in important ways....
34. For a particularly dreary example, see Peter H. Schuck, When the Exception Becomes the
Rule: Regulatory Equity and the Formulation of Energy Policy Through an Exceptions Process,
1984 DUKE L.J. 163 [hereinafter Schuck, When the Exception Becomes the Rule] (presenting case
studies of the exceptions process in petroleum regulation to demonstrate that the process en-
hanced regulatory equity).
35. There are exceptions, of course, including DANIEL CARPENTER, REPUTATION AND
POWER: ORGANIZATIONAL IMAGE AND PHARMACEUTICAL REGULATION AT THE FDA (2010)
(describing the historical complexity of the Food and Drug Administration), and MASHAw &
HARFST, supra note 25 (describing the history of the National Highway Traffic Safety Adminis-
tration in order to examine "the legal and institutional armaments with which America's domes-
tic policy battles are waged").
36. See Robert L. Rabin, Administrative Law in Transition: A Discipline in Search of an Or-




. . . [I]t is in these various low-visibility byways of the administrative
system that the administrative lawyer does most of his work....
. . . The fact is that virtually no court of general jurisdiction, surely
not the United States Supreme Court, pays much attention to these
issues. For in addition to the limited range of questions amenable to
review, judicial intervention is ad hoc and almost always un-
systematic. Of necessity, Supreme Court review of a decision by
the Forest Service or the Department of Transportation has a dis-
embodied, abstract quality. The Court usually has only the vaguest
sense of whether its decision is likely to be implemented effectively
or to be of real consequence since it probably last reviewed a case
from the same agency a considerable number of years earlier, and
then with regard to entirely different legal questions ih an entirely
different factual context.37
Indeed, I would go even further than Rabin on this-though I
strongly suspect that he would agree. As political scientists like James
Q. Wilson have demonstrated, the nonlegal factors that most shape
agencies are their self-perceived task structures (the routines and in-
centives required to perform the agency's specific tasks) and their or-
ganizational cultures (the agency's dominant ideology, values, and
interpersonal patterns).38 To cite a classic example of this case-study
genre, the Forest Service can best be understood in terms of its rang-
ers' isolation in the field, their need to accommodate themselves to
the local cultures in which they must live and work, and the difficulties
that this "going native" imperative creates for bureaucratic control
over them.39 The contrast between the Federal Bureau of Investiga-
tion (FBI) and the Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) is another ex-
ample. The FBI is characterized by its centralized control of its agents
working at their desks under close supervision. The DEA is shaped
by the independence required by its agents, who often operate under-
cover on the mean streets and in a necessarily situational, en-
trepreneurial fashion that is resistant to rule-based controls. 40 Price-
control agencies, another example, are defined by the political pres-
sures that build up when shortages inevitably develop: industry win-
ners and losers become apparent, and exceptions must be granted. 41
Finally, prisons are defined in significant part by the need to maintain
37. Id. at 127-28 (footnotes omitted).
38. See generally MICHAEL LIPSKY, STREET-LEVEL BUREAUCRACY: DILEMMAS OF THE INDI-
VIDUAL IN PUBLIC SERVICES (1980). See also WILSON, supra note 5, at 32.
39. See generally HERBERT KAUFMAN, THE FOREST RANGER: A STUDY IN ADMINISTRATIVE
BEHAVIOR (1960).
40. See generally JAMES 0. WILSON, THE INVESTIGATORS: MANAGING FBI AND NARCOTICS
AGENTS (1978).
41. See generally ROBERT A. KAGAN, REGULATORY JUSTICE: IMPLEMENTING A WAGE-PRICE
FREEZE (1978); Schuck, When the Exception Becomes the Rule, supra note 34.
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a delicate equilibrium and an economy of exchange between prisoners
and guards.42
As Rabin notes in the last sentence of the excerpt quoted above,
policy implementation is another bureaucratic process that adminis-
trative state scholars seldom study, theorize, or even carefully de-
scribe. Typically, it is the legal rules themselves that are of chief
interest to the scholar, and the implementation of those rules is taken
as a given, if not ignored entirely. Yet the reality is often quite differ-
ent. In many cases, implementation is a gnarly gordian knot of unan-
ticipated, poorly understood, and stubborn obstacles to success. To
change the metaphor, it is a black box that can best be illuminated
through the kind of painstaking study urged-and exemplified-by
Rabin, examining individual agencies as they struggle with their lim-
ited tools to mold their resistant external environments into
compliance. 43
Some legal scholars have attempted to dispel this obscurity. The
most revealing of these attempts are studies of structural injunctions
designed to reform agency performance and legality, and the tortuous,
protracted processes by which courts seek to implement them.44 With
remarkable regularity, these studies show the fecklessness of even the
most resolute courts as they try to reshape the real-world behavior of
the defendant institutions of the administrative state, not to speak of
the conduct of the private citizens and civil society groups upon whom
the effectiveness of the decree ultimately depends.
In thinking about the implications of these findings, consider the
advantages that courts possess compared with agencies, implying that
agencies are likely to face even greater implementation failures.
Courts enjoy greater legitimacy and prestige among members of the
public. Judicial sanctions for noncompliance, including fines and im-
prisonment, may be even greater than those ordinarily available to
agencies, which usually can be enforced only after drawn-out proceed-
ings in the courts and obeisances to the legislative powers-that-be.
This is certainly not to deny that agencies possess their own institu-
42. See generally GRESHAM M. SYKES, THE SOCIETY OF CAPTIVES: A STUDY OF A MAXIMUM
SECURITY PRISON (1958).
43. See generally JEFFREY L. PRESSMAN & AARON WILDAVSKY, IMPLEMENTATION (3d ed.
1984) (describing how different government agencies must use results to improve the implemen-
tation and performance of government programs). See also LIPSKY, supra note 38, at 29-39
(describing the ways that street-level bureaucracies characteristically provide fewer resources
than necessary for workers to do their jobs adequately).
44. See generally Ross SANDLER & DAVID SCHOENBROD, DEMOCRACY BY DECREE: WHAT
HAPPENS WHEN COURTS RuN GOVERNMENT (2003); PETER H. SCHUCK, SUINO GOVERNMENT
125-98 (1983).
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tional advantages for implementation relative to courts.45 Rather, the
point here is that to study the administrative process in its formal as-
pects without also paying close attention to the problems of imple-
mentation is, proverbially, to perform Hamlet without the Prince of
Denmark.
C Administrative Discretion
Like other administrative law scholars, Rabin has been preoccupied
in all of his work by the problem of agency discretion 46-and with
good reason. Discretion threatens a number of values cherished by
liberals and conservatives alike. Democratic governance demands ac-
countability by those who are authorized to wield official power, yet
discretion can defeat, or at least attenuate, that accountability if it ei-
ther exceeds legal limits or, more commonly, if it is hard to tell what
those limits are.4 7 Discretion can defeat horizontal equity by treating
similar cases dissimilarly. To the extent that its exercise is opaque,
discretion conceals the true grounds of decision, which may violate
due process, undermine legitimate expectations regarding the content
and application of rules, and impede effective review and the correc-
tion of errors.48 Indeed, discretion makes it difficult to determine
whether an error has in fact occurred. By loosening legal constraints
and augmenting officials' power, discretion encourages arrogance and
manipulation of those who depend on its fair exercise; it facilitates
corruption. 49
These concerns are common ground among commentators. Rabin
contributes a number of case studies in which some of these problems
are manifest, and he offers plausible ways, most of them familiar con-
45. I have emphasized these advantages in my own work. See, e.g., Peter H. Schuck, FDA
Preemption of State Tort Law in Drug Regulation: Finding the Sweet Spot, 13 ROGER WILLIAMS
U. L. REv. 73, 92-93 (2008); Peter H. Schuck, The New Judicial Ideology of Tort Law, in 37 NEW
DIRECTIONS IN LIABILITY LAW 4, 15 (Walter Olson ed., 1988).
46. See, e.g., Rabin, Agency Criminal Referrals, supra note 26.
47. For one manifestation of the discretion problem, see DAVID SCHOENBROD, POWER WITH-
our RESPONSIBILTrY: How CONGRESS ABUSES THE PEOPLE THROUGH DELEGATION (1993).
48. These dangers help explain Rabin's emphasis on "adequate explanation for adverse treat-
ment when substantial individual interests are at stake." See Robert L. Rabin, Job Security and
Due Process: Monitoring Administrative Discretion Through a Reasons Requirement, 44 U. CHI.
L. REV. 60, 63 (1976) [hereinafter Rabin, Job Security and Due Process].
49. This is true at least as modernized American systems define corruption. See Lawrence
Rosen, Understanding Corruption, AM. INT., Mar.-Apr. 2010, at 78, 78 ("We mean by the term
the influencing of the performance of a public duty-meant to be carried out in accordance with
objective, impersonal protocols-for personal ends.").
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straining techniques, in which they might be remedied.50 He also
makes an important historical claim about the larger role of discretion
in struggles over the administrative state: "[T]he post-New Deal era
signalled a general shift from preoccupation with the legitimacy of
agency power to concern about controlling administrative discre-
tion."51 When Rabin made this claim in his 1986 article on the history
of federal regulation, it seemed convincing, even obvious.
But in 2012, opponents of the Patient Protection and Affordable
Care Act,52 the greatest expansion of the administrative state since the
New Deal, are mounting serious challenges to the law on the very
ground that Rabin claimed had been relegated to the dustbin of ad-
ministrative law history and superseded by challenges to agency dis-
cretion.53 These challenges go to power of the U.S. Department of
Health and Human Services under the Constitution (here, the power
to require people to purchase insurance), 54 not its discretion. This de-
velopment in no way discredits Rabin's historical-trend claim. In-
stead, it suggests that in the more-than-century-old struggle over the
legitimacy of agency power in our administrative state, no victory is
wholly secure.
D. Historical Evolution of the Administrative State
Of Rabin's many contributions to our understanding of the histori-
cal development of the administrative state, the most ambitious is his
1986 article, Federal Regulation in Historical Perspective.55 The article
constitutes an immense achievement, developing a succession of dif-
ferent models of public intervention-each responding to the per-
ceived limitations of earlier ones-and spanning more than a century
of turbulent economic, social, political, technological, and legal
change.
Rabin's magisterial account is even more impressive in one impor-
tant, easily overlooked respect. Histories of the federal administrative
state conventionally begin with the Interstate Commerce Act of 1887
50. See, e.g., Rabin, Administrative Law in Transition, supra note 36, at 135-45; Rabin, Agency
Criminal Referrals, supra note 26, at 1080-90; Rabin, Do You Believe, supra note 32, at 681-84;
Rabin, Job Security and Due Process, supra note 48, at 84-87.
51. Robert L. Rabin, Federal Regulation in Historical Perspective, 38 STAN. L. REv. 1189, 1299
(1986) [hereinafter Rabin, Federal Regulation].
52. Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119 (2010) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 21,
25, 26, 29, and 42 U.S.C.).
53. See, e.g., Florida v. U.S. Dep't of Health & Human Servs., 648 F.3d 1235 (11th Cir. 2011),
cert. granted, 132 S. Ct. 604 (2011).
54. See 26 U.S.C. § 5000A(a) (2006 & Supp. IV 2010).
55. Rabin, Federal Regulation, supra note 51.
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and the conditions leading to its enactment. 56 Rabin does so as well.
At the same time, however, he also notes some earlier, lesser known
federal interventions-particularly land-grant policy and the regula-
tion of steamboat boilers-that long predated, and arguably antici-
pated, the familiar later ones like the Interstate Commerce Act.5 7
These previously obscure interventions, to which Jerry Mashaw ac-
cords additional prominence in his recent exhumation of what he calls
"the lost one hundred years of federal administrative law,"58 are
surely becoming part of the standard administrative law histories. Ra-
bin, twenty-five years before, identified them as part of the evolution-
ary story, although he did not analyze them in the rich Mashavian
detail that was far, far outside the scope of his article. 59
In trying to distill the essential teachings of Rabin's historical ac-
count, several features of the work are especially interesting. First, his
emphasis on technological change is an important driver of the admin-
istrative state. In the nineteenth century, it was railroads. During
World War I, it was the mobilization of industrial activity. In the
1920s and 1930s, it was motor vehicles, air travel, agricultural produc-
tivity, and telecommunications. Since the 1960s, new environmental
contaminants and detection methods have spawned regulation. To-
day-mostly since Rabin wrote Federal Regulation-radically new in-
formation systems have facilitated lower cost globalized commerce,
intensified competition, raised new concerns about privacy and cyber-
crime, and much more.
Second, Rabin associates his periodization (his seven "eras") with
evolving public values.60 He contends that the public philosophies of
these eras-whether the Populist, Progressive, World War I, the New
Deal, post-New Deal, the Great Society, or Public Interest periods-
are usually fueled by social crises that animate and shape new regula-
tory interventions. These powerful normative currents propel new
conceptions of federal and state responsibilities; of judicial review; of
the legitimate role of markets, private associations, and private causes
of action; and of regulatory capacity and technique.
56. See, e.g., Jerry L. Mashaw, Federal Administration and Administrative Law in the Gilded
Age, 119 YALE L.J. 1362, 1365 (2010). A contemporaneous statute, the Pendleton Civil Service
Act of 1883, ch. 27, 22 Stat. 403 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 5 U.S.C.), is also a
familiar starting point.
57. See Rabin, Federal Regulation, supra note 51, at 1195-96.
58. Jerry L. Mashaw, Recovering American Administrative Law: Federalist Foundations,
1787-1801, 115 YALE L.J. 1256, 1256 (2006).
59. For another fine example of a detailed, book-length examination of an agency, see
DANIEL P. CARPENTER, THE FORGING OF BUREAUCRATIC AUTONOMY (2001).
60. See generally Rabin, Federal Regulation, supra note 51.
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Third, Rabin does not permit his unifying themes and his historical
and analytical schema to conceal the administrative state's fundamen-
tal heterogeneity. To the contrary, he reminds us of the situational
differentiation of regulatory forms and authorities, of the degrees of
judicial deference that they have enjoyed over time, and of the politics
in which they have always been enmeshed.
Fourth, an important kind of heterogeneity within the administra-
tive state is the distinctions that Rabin acutely develops among (1)
traditional economic regulation, which usually applies to a particular
industry; (2) more recent schemes of social regulation, which apply to
almost all firms in the economy; and (3) redistributive programs,
which involve individuals' claims to public resources as a matter either
of legal entitlement or of agency discretion. Although the antecedents
of such redistributive programs can be found in the early nineteenth-
century61 and post-Civil War period,62 they have become vastly larger
and more important since the New Deal and Great Society eras.
Writing in the mid-1980s, Rabin emphasized that the main features
of the federal administrative state had by then become politically le-
gitimate and judicially enforced.63 Yet even as he wrote, changing
theories of economic efficiency and of "public choice" were helping to
fuel reforms in specific regulatory policies.64 Some of these changes
were dramatic, as with the deregulation of the airline, energy, and sur-
face-transportation sectors65 and the growing interest in market-aided
regulatory techniques, such as emissions trading under the 1970 Clean
Air Act Amendments. 66
Although Rabin was deeply attentive to the recurrent cycles of reg-
ulatory and anti-regulatory fervor in American history and political
economy, even he has probably been surprised by much of what has
61. See Michele Landis Dauber, The Sympathetic State, 23 LAW & HIST. REV. 387, 394-96
(2005) (discussing federal disaster relief).
62. See THEDA SKOCPOL, PROTECTING SOLDIERS AND MOTHERS: THE POLITICAL ORIGINS OF
SOCIAL POLICY IN THE UNITED STATES 2 (1992) (discussing post-Civil War systems of social
provisions).
63. See Rabin, Federal Regulation, supra note 51, at 1302 n.397 (quoting Envtl. Def. Fund, Inc.
v. Ruckelshaus, 439 F.2d 584, 597 (D.C. Cir. 1971)).
64. See Joseph D. Kearney & Thomas W. Merrill, The Great Transformation of Regulated
Industries Law, 98 COLuM. L. REV. 1323, 1383-84 (1998).
65. Airline Deregulation Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-504, 92 Stat. 1705 (codified as amended
in scattered sections of 49 U.S.C.); Natural Gas Policy Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-621, § 121, 92
Stat. 3350, 3369 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. 3331) (eliminating price controls for certain
natural-gas sales); ICC Termination Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-88, 109 Stat. 803 (codified as
amended in scattered section of 49) (abolishing the Interstate Commerce Commission to reform
economic regulation of transportation).
66. Rabin discussed such techniques in a short article, Robert L. Rabin, Ozone Depletion
Revisited: EPA Regulation of Chlorofluorocarbons, REGULATION, Mar.-Apr. 1981, at 32, 36-37.
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followed in the development of the administrative state. What cyclical
theory would have predicted the continuous explosion in civil rights,
environmental, workplace, and immigration regulation since 1985
under administrations of all ideological hues? Other than the reduc-
tive truisms that politicians always seek to satisfy powerful voter blocs
and that Congress often goes its own way, what causal theory would
explain the huge expansion of the Medicare entitlement that President
George W. Bush promoted at a time when the country was fighting
costly wars in Iraq and Afghanistan? 67 Or the fact that a Democratic
administration helped to jettison more than sixty years of New Deal
controls over the banking industry, only to see the next Democratic
administration impose far more extensive controls over the financial
services industry, not to mention those over the even larger health
care sector?68 How did these highly prescriptive interventions man-
age to overthrow the far more modest policing and monitoring models
of regulation that, in Rabin's account, had limited the scope of the
administrative state for more than a century? And on the redistribu-
tive side of state building, who would have predicted in 1985, only
three years after a bipartisan fix to the Social Security financing sys-
tem, that entitlement reform would be the rallying cry of many Demo-
crats in the Congress that convened in January 2011?
One further motif of Rabin's administrative state historiography
bears mention. Gazing back across more than a century of adminis-
trative development, he discerns at least one troubling constant: a lack
of coherence. 69 In overviewing his narrative, he writes that "Congress
and the courts have never fashioned a coherent theory of administra-
tive government."70 Ideology about the state's role, the design of reg-
ulatory institutions, the overall strategy of regulation, even the
Supreme Court's judicial review of agency decisions all lack coher-
ence. Exhibit A in Rabin's account of the Reagan era (the last period
considered by Rabin) is the Court's inconsistent treatment of social
regulation as it oscillated between resistance to politicized regulatory
agencies in Motor Vehicle Manufacturers Ass'n v. State Farm Mutual
67. Bush Signs Law to Cover Drugs for the Elderly, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 9, 2003, at Al.
68. See Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, Pub. L. No. 106-102, 113 Stat. 1338 (1999) (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 12 and 15 U.S.C), repealing 12 U.S.C. §§ 78, 377 (sections 32
and 20, respectively, of the Banking Act of 1933).
69. Rabin allows (or so I found) only one exception to this constant: Herbert Hoover's associ-
ational model. See Rabin, Federal Regulation, supra note 51, at 1241-42.
70. Id. at 1194.
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Auto Insurance Co. and broad deference to such politicization in
Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council.71
But do these sorts of patterns demonstrate incoherence, or are they
manifestations of something considerably less damning and worri-
some? I take up this question in the final section of this Part.
E. Competing Values in Administration
In his work on the administrative state-as well as in his tort schol-
arship-Rabin is a pluralist, a pragmatist, and an interest-balancer. I
do not intend this as faint praise; quite the contrary. These qualities
together constitute a hard-won virtue that I esteem highly and try to
achieve in my own work. It is hard won because it requires the
scholar to resist the always-alluring temptation to find a single beacon
by which to navigate one's intellectual journey. If one's lodestar is
equality, for example, then one can more readily evaluate all phenom-
ena according to their equalizing propensities. 7 2 (I put to one side
here the well-known conceptual and implementation difficulties that
the notion of equality itself presents.) If instead the criterion is lib-
erty, economic efficiency, communal solidarity, or some other value,
then the same advantage applies (subject to the same difficulties).
Those for whom a single value is paramount are relatively comforta-
ble advancing bold, striking theories that seem crisp, consistent, co-
herent, and comprehensive-theories that others can understand and
apply with relative ease. Using the well-known taxonomy applied to
characterize polar cognitive and analytical styles, such people will
tend to be lumpers, not splitters.7 3
Rabin-like me-is an inveterate splitter. He affirms the salience
and legitimacy of the manifold values implicated by the administrative
state, and he insists that all of them be given their due weight. Like
any good splitter, he does not offer any overarching theory of what
weight is due for each. Presumably, he views that as a matter for dem-
ocratic politics to decide, constrained only by the Constitution and
popular morality.
Nowhere is this Rabinesque orientation more evident than in his
critique of Charles Reich's famous article, The New Property.74 Ra-
71. Id. at 1321-25 (noting that, in the 1970s, the Court also "oscillat[ed] between a search for
the Right Answer and tolerance of a Best Effort").
72. See generally Peter Westen, The Empty Idea of Equality, 95 HARv. L. REv. 537 (1982).
73. "Some social observers are 'lumpers' who stress similarities among human cultures.
Others are 'splitters' who stress differences among societies." Robert C. Ellickson, The Inevita-
ble Trend Toward Universally Recognizable Signals of Property Claims: An Essay for Carol
Rose, 19 WM. & MARY BILL RTs. J. 1015, 1023 (2011).
74. Charles A. Reich, The New Property, 73 YALE. L.J. 733 (1964).
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bin, although deeply committed to the protection of individual rights
against the excessive intrusions of the state, rebukes Reich for elevat-
ing the rights of self-realization and life-style choice (as defined by
Reich) above all other considerations. 75 Rabin acknowledges the "ge-
nius" of Reich's ability to "detail the singular threats to individuality
posed by an interventionist state, committed ironically to unprece-
dented levels of public services and benefits," 76 but condemns Reich's
tendency "to lose sight of the countervailing considerations that make
more intelligible" the limitations that the state imposes on
individuality.77
"The crux of the problem," Rabin explains, "is very simply stated.
Those who would exercise their individuality without constraint often
would do so at the expense of others."78 Social values usually conflict
and thus must be weighed against one another. Like any conscien-
tious interest-balancing splitter, Rabin seeks to identify the competing
values-in the New Property context, he contrasts "conscientious"
conduct with "conformist" conduct-without providing any general or
systematic formula for reconciling them.79 This is emphatically not to
say that Rabin eschews personal judgment about how such conflicts
should be addressed and even resolved. Rather, he insists that the
law's solution must ultimately depend on details and context, and on
some combination of-to use Reich's polarity-public participation
and technocratic expertise. 0 Rabin's intellectual stance, then, is not
antitheoretical. It is, rather, profoundly suspicious of the claim of any
grand, high-level, Reichian theory to improve our thinking about the
kinds of complex social problems that preoccupy the administrative
state and that law and politics must resolve.
III. CONCLUSION
This brings me, finally, to a quibble-perhaps it is more than a quib-
ble-with Rabin's normative assessment of the American administra-
tive state. His persistent criticism is that it lacks coherence, a
complaint lodged most frequently in his magnum opus, Federal Regu-
lation in Historical Perspective.81 He asserts that "the everyday polit-
ics of regulatory reform has been conducted without much concern for
75. Robert L. Rabin, The Administrative State and Its Excesses: Reflections on The New Prop-
erty, 24 U.S.F. L. REV. 273, 277 (1990) (reviewing Reich, supra note 74).
76. Id. at 282.
77. Id.
78. Id. at 283.
79. See id. at 285.
80. See id. at 283-89.
81. See generally Rabin, Federal Regulation, supra note 51.
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establishing a coherent theory of administrative government"; 82 that
"Congress and the courts have never fashioned a coherent theory of
administrative government";83 that the Interstate Commerce Commis-
sion "did not reflect a coherent approach to railroad regulation";8 4
that "Congress and the Court failed to develop a coherent policy on
business consolidation and competition";85 that the Progressive Era
Court failed to set "coherent boundaries on public regulation"; 86 that
the New Deal programs failed to create a coherent governmental
foundation for economic recovery;87 that the courts have no coherent
"theory of administrative expertise" to deal "with the technical and
political dimensions of the regulatory process";88 and that the regula-
tory process "remains devoid of any coherent ideological
framework." 89
On its face, this array of charges constitutes a very serious indict-
ment of the administrative state. Unfortunately, Rabin never defines
what he means by the word coherent (or its cognates). Accordingly, it
remains unclear what the actual content of his indictment is. But al-
most regardless of what it means, this vaunted criterion of coherence
seems to sit uneasily, perhaps even inconsistently (incoherently?),
with his larger analytical style and commitment. 90 After all, Rabin is
the consummate pluralist interest-balancer, the reflexive splitter, the
scourge of comprehensive, high-level Reichian theories of the admin-
istrative state. Given his admirably pragmatic approach to the admin-
istrative state, his persistent demand that it be "coherent" is, well,
incoherent-at least if he, like the Merriam-Webster Collegiate Dic-
tionary, defines coherent to mean "logically or aesthetically ordered
or integrated."9' In this context, moreover, such a demand is incon-
82. Id. at 1194.
83. Id.
84. Id. at 1207; see also id. at 1215 (noting that the U.S. Supreme Court "was not about to
countenance comprehensive planning by the ICC without a specific congressional directive").
85. Id. at 1218; see also id. at 1224 (noting that the Federal Trade Commission Act and Clay-
ton Act "failed to adopt any coherent strategy towards reconciling business growth with fair
competitive practices").
86. Id. at 1230.
87. Rabin, Federal Regulation, supra note 51, at 1251-52; see also id. at 1262-63 (noting that
the New Deal recovery program lacked "a single coherent reform strategy").
88. Id. at 1325; see also id. at 1326 (noting that the judicial system gets lower marks for intel-
lectual coherence).
89. Id. at 1325.
90. In responding to an earlier draft of this Article, Rabin notes that "then and now, I meant
the critique of failure to achieve coherence as a positivist (that is, descriptive) critique and asser-
tion, not a value judgment." Email from Robert L. Rabin to Peter H. Schuck (Jan. 10, 2011,
12:23 PST) (on file with author).
91. MERRIAM-WEBSTER'S COLLEGIATE Dic-riONARY 241 (11th ed. 2008).
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gruous-that is, it is incompatible and inappropriate to the thing being
assessed. For these reasons, it is also unintelligible (a common syno-
nym for incoherent). To expect the administrative state to be coher-
ent in any meaningful sense is equivalent to expecting the proverbial
pig to wear lipstick.
The American administrative state is shaped by liberal democratic
values and by a notoriously messy, unpredictable, pluralistic, institu-
tionally competitive political process. The legitimacy of this process in
turn depends on how well it reflects the extraordinarily complex, eth-
nically and normatively diverse, rapidly changing civil society that it
serves. Compromise, much of it inevitably opportunistic and unprinci-
pled, is designed into this system. Where an administrative state like
ours is concerned, coherence is surely an overrated virtue, if it is a
virtue at all.
After all, what overarching ordering principle or criterion could
possibly render this system coherent? None, I believe, except the
commitment to democracy and the rule of law-two concepts that are
not only famously question begging, but that also (as our Bill of
Rights affirms) systemically conflict and compete with one another.
In a society like ours, coherence in any stronger sense would be the
enemy of robust, American-style democratic governance.
Thoroughgoing reform of the administrative state is desirable, in-
deed essential, and reform proposals do and should appeal to larger
principles of justice and policy. But as Rabin's exemplary work
teaches us, those principles will always be multiple, conceptually am-
biguous, politically contested, and compromised in their implementa-
tion. To that extent, they will be incoherent. So much the better for
our democracy.
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